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Abstract 
The Supreme Court is a judicial institution that has existed since the Indonesian state was 
formed in 1945. This institution was formed based on the mandate of the constitution in article 
24 of the 1945 Constitution, namely "judicial power is exercised by a Supreme Court and other 
judicial bodies according to law". But in fact, in the course of Indonesia's national and state life 
from its independence in 1945 to 1998, the judicial power exercised by the Supreme Court was 
not free and independent, both institutionally and independently of its judges. The influence of 
the executive power held by the president on the judicial power exercised by the Supreme Court 
can actually be observed in the politics of regulating judicial power through laws by the 
executive and legislative bodies during the old order government (President Soekarno 1945-
1966) and the new order (President Soeharto 1967-1998). The judicial power law that was 
formed has actually subordinated the judiciary under the power of the president. This is the 
result of efforts to form the state of Indonesia as a country based on kinship that does not adhere 
to a separation of powers (executive, legislative and judicial) as the trias politica concept put 
forward by John Locke and Montesquie. With the 1998 reforms which in turn succeeded in 
amending the 1945 Constitution in order to realize the Indonesian state as a democratic legal 
state, the judiciary has been strengthened as an institution that is truly free and independent 
from the influence of extra-judicial powers.  
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Introduction 
In a state of law, according to the rechstaat concept, the rule of law and socialist legality 
essentially implies the establishment of a judicial institution, so that law and justice can be 
upheld. Law and justice are two inseparable things, like the human body which consists of 
body and soul. 
In order for legal practice to be truly fair, the presence of a judiciary is a necessity. In the legal 
system theory put forward by Lawrence Friedman, law can be upright determined by three 
things, namely, legal structure, legal culture or behavior, and legal material. The legal structure 
focuses more on law enforcement officers played by lawywers (law bearers), namely Judges, 
Prosecutors, Police, and Advocates. And in order for the effective role of the law bearer, a law 
enforcement agency was formed, and the most important thing to determine law enforcement 
is the judiciary. 
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Because the judiciary strongly determines the upholding of law and justice, this institution must 
be positioned as an independent and neutral institution (Ferejohn & Kramer, 2002; Diver, 
1979). The neutrality and independence of the judiciary is very much determined by the 
existence of the judge who plays a role in it, and the existence and role of the judge will be 
largely determined by his competence both scientifically and morally (faith). The authority or 
dignity of the judiciary lies with the judge who operates the institution. Because it is called a 
judicial institution, there should be no other thoughts and actions that must be taken by court 
judges except to fulfill the sense of justice in society, especially justice seekers. 
Since its establishment in 1945, in its constitution, the 1945 Constitution has declared itself a 
rule of law (rechtstaat) not a power state (machtstaat), which of course has to present a judicial 
institution. The first sign of the order to establish a judicial institution in Indonesia is stated in 
article 24 of the 1945 Constitution that "judicial power is exercised by a Supreme Court and 
other judicial bodies according to law". 
The Supreme Court (MA) is a judicial institution that still exists to exercise judicial power 
(judiciary) in Indonesia in addition to other branches of state power, namely the legislature 
(DPR / MPR) and the executive (President) (Amir, 2020). In its journey, the Supreme Court's 
role in carrying out its functions and authorities as a judicial institution in upholding law and 
justice has experienced an influence of extra-judicial powers, namely executive and legislative 
powers (the most concrete is the influence of executive power (Ginsburg, 2003; Nason, 2012; 
Harrington & Manji, 2015; Junaedi, 2020). 
In this paper, the author intends to describe the existence of the independence of the judiciary 
which historically has been influenced and intervened by extra-judicial powers, especially the 
influence of the president's power (executive power holders). Experts divided the journey of 
life into the state of the Indonesian nation in three stages, namely; 1) the old order, with the 
icon of President Soekarno's power which is famous for his political policy of the Guided 
Democracy constitutional state, 2) the new order, symbolized by the power of President 
Soeharto, who is known as the father of development with a constitutional political policy, 
namely Pancasila Democracy, with a very popular doctrine of "promising Pancasila and UUD 
1945 purely and consistently ”, and 3) the reformation order, which was marked by the success 
of reformists in amending the 1945 Constitution which further clarified the existence of an 
independent, neutral and independent judicial power. The national elite who pushed for and 
spearheaded the reform movement in turn succeeded in amending the 1945 Constitution, which 
in essence was to strengthen the Indonesian state as a democratic constitutional state. 
Of the three stages of the life of the Indonesian nation above, the existence of the independent 
judiciary (judiciary) experienced significant influence and intervention during the old and new 
order government regimes. Ironically, this influence is based on the interpretation of the 
constitution (UUD 1945) which is interpreted by making laws which regulate it related to 
judicial power and / or judicial institutions. This situation is one that underlies the thoughts and 
actions of the groups of fighters for reform in 1998, to immediately amend the 1945 
Constitution so that the order of Indonesian state life returns to the ideals of proclamation and 
the goals of the state as set out in the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution. Based on the above 
background, problems related to the existence of the independence of the judiciary as an 
institution exercising judicial power in Indonesia before and after the amendment of the 1945 
Constitution can be formulated. judiciary in exercising judicial power after amendments to the 
1945 Constitution. 
Methods 
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As in general, legal research is divided into two types, namely the type of normative legal 
research and the type of empirical legal research. In this paper the authors use a normative 
research type using qualitative analysis. By collecting research materials (data) contained in 
the 1945 Constitution (before and after the amendment), laws governing judicial power and / 
or judicial institutions, opinions or views of constitutional law experts who provide an 
assessment of the existence of the independence of the judiciary in Indonesia 
Results and Discussion 
Regulations and institutional practices of judicial power prior to amendments to the 1945 
Constitution 
Judicial power according to Articles 24 and 25 of the 1945 Constitution is exercised by a 
judicial institution, namely the Supreme Court (MA), wherein the way the Supreme Court 
works is regulated according to law. Article 24 states that; Judicial power is exercised by a 
Supreme Court and other judicial bodies according to law. Furthermore, Article 25 states that; 
the structure and powers of the judicial bodies shall be regulated by law. Meanwhile, in 
explaining how the Supreme Court's position as a judicial power side by side with the 
legislative and executive powers, it can be seen in the explanation of the 1945 Constitution, 
which reads: judicial power is independent power, meaning that it is independent of the 
influence of government power. In this connection, a guarantee must be made in the law 
regarding the position of judges. 
From the norms of the 1945 Constitution above, the existence of judicial power carried by the 
Supreme Court implies a free, independent and independent power that cannot be influenced 
by powers outside of itself. This is as stated by Waluyo, (1992), that: It is further emphasized 
by the explanation of these articles (articles 24 and 25 of the 1945 Constitution) that judicial 
power is an independent power, meaning that it is independent from the influence of 
government power. In this connection, a guarantee must be made in the law regarding the 
position of judges. 
 Furthermore, the independence and independence of judicial power in practice will also be 
very much determined by the law as the elaboration of the mandate of articles 24 and 25 of the 
1945 Constitution (Jackson, 2006; Moustafa, 2007). Meanwhile, the laws that will regulate 
judicial power are very much determined by the President and the DPR which according to the 
1945 Constitution that the President and The DPR is an institution that has the power to form 
laws, especially the President who holds the power to form laws with the approval of the DPR. 
According to Nasution, (2007) with this statute instrument the President has intervened and 
controlled the judicial power. Both President Soekarno and President Soeharto have used the 
law to control the Supreme Court as an institution that exercises judicial power so that it cannot 
work freely and independently. 
"If traced back, the actual efforts to lock up the judiciary in Indonesia began when this country 
entered the Guided Democracy era in 1959" ... the division of power as outlined in the 1945 
Constitution, let alone the separation of powers between branches of government (based on the 
trias poiitica doctrine) eliminated, because President Soekarno considered the doctrine to be 
obsolete. The heads of high and highest state institutions were placed under the president as 
ministers, and at that time the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Wirjono Projodikoro, was 
also appointed as a minister in the Gotong Royong Cabinet. 
Although explicitly in the explanation of articles 24 and 25 of the 1945 Constitution that 
judicial power is independent of government power. However, it turns out that the executive 
power, in this case the president, continues to violate commitments in the constitution. Indeed, 
in the perspective of the 1945 Constitution, the President has been positioned as a very 
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expansive power.  One of the most strategic powers of the president is holding the power to 
form laws with the approval of the DPR. This means that the president as the holder of 
executive power as well as the legislative power. It is true that the Indonesian state does not 
adhere to the separation of powers theory, but applies the theory of power sharing. So that the 
president can interpret that his power can cross over to the legislative power, which in fact is 
only in the hands of the DPR. 
As the implementation of articles 24 and 25 of the 1945 Constitution, the government (the 
President with the approval of the DPR) forms a number of laws, including: (1) Law Number 
19 Year 1948 concerning the Composition and Power of Judicial Bodies and the Attorney 
General's Office; (2) Law Number 19 Year 1964 concerning Basic Provisions of Judicial 
Power; (3) Law Number 13 Year 1965 concerning Courts in General Courts and the Supreme 
Court; (4) Law No. 14 of 1970 concerning the Principles of Judicial Power. 
In Law 19 of 1964 and Law 13 of 1965 there are provisions that clearly disturb the 
independence (independence) of the judiciary, because President Soekarno as the great leader 
of the revolution after issuing Presidential Decree on July 5, 1959, which essentially returned 
the state constitution to the 1945 Constitution. After this decree President Soekarno made a 
policy known as Manifesto Politik (Manipol) under the practice of Guided Democracy. 
The provisions in two laws (Law 19/1964 and Law 13/1965) which have clearly provided room 
for executive power (the president) to interfere with the judicial power (judiciary) are found in: 
first, Article 19 of Law 19/1964 which reads "In the interests of the revolution, the honor of 
the State and the Nation or the urgent interests of the people, the President can step down or 
interfere in court matters". This provision explains that intervening means the termination of 
the case being examined and in this case the court does not issue a decision, while the 
intervention means that the president can participate in making a decision on a case.  
Secondly, Article 23 of Law 13 of 1965 describes in more detail what kind of president's 
intervention in the judicial process organized by the judiciary, which reads: (1) In cases where 
the President intervenes, the trial shall immediately stop the examination being carried out and 
announce the President's decision in an open session by affixing a note in the minutes and 
attaching the Presidential decision in the file without imposing a verdict; (2) In cases where the 
President expresses his desire to intervene in accordance with the provisions of the Basic Law 
on Judicial Powers, the trial shall terminate deliberation with the prosecutor; (3) Deliberation 
as referred to in paragraph (2) is aimed at carrying out the wishes of the President; (4) The 
President's wishes and the results of the deliberations shall be announced in an open session 
after the session is reopened. The regulation and practice of the judiciary in the era of the old 
order government regime under the control of President Soekarno have clearly killed the 
freedom and independence of the judicial power. So much is the power of the president to 
interfere in the judicial process, to the point of being able to stop cases and also to issue 
decisions. The wishes of the president are clearly stated in the provisions of the law, while the 
wishes of the president can only be made of personal desires that harm the interests of many 
people. And this has the potential to give birth to an authoritarian, repressive and anti-criticism 
attitude that has implications for human rights violations. 
The end of President Soekarno's power in 1966 brought new hope, which was marked by the 
inauguration of Suharto as President of the Republic of Indonesia on March 12, 1967 by the 
Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). The presence of this new presidential 
official is predicted to provide an improvement over the chaos in state life during the old order. 
The main thing is that the judiciary is not independent in upholding law and justice, which can 
still be interfered with by the wishes of the President.  How the regulation and practice of 
International Journal Papier  Volume 1, Issue 2 (Page 119-128) 
Public Review  ISSN: 2709-023X 
 
123 
Copyright © 2020, International Journal Papier Public Review, Under the license CC BY-SA 4.0 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.47667/ijppr.v1i2.91    
judicial power after President Soakarno's leadership can be seen in the issuance of Law no. 14 
of 1970 which was effective in the New Order government regime with a great power icon in 
the hands of President Soeharto. The existence of Law 14/1970 was initially a new hope for 
the Indonesian nation, especially in terms of independence and independence of judicial power. 
This is because the experience during the old order government regime with an icon of great 
power in the hands of President Soekarno, has influenced and controlled the Supreme Court as 
a symbol of justice. In its journey, the practice of judicial power which refers to Law 14/1970 
has finally experienced a distortion due to the enormous opportunity for the influence of the 
executive power, namely President Soeharto, to the Supreme Court. The power of the president 
can enter through the appointment of judges to judicial bodies within the Supreme Court 
(General Courts, Military Courts, State Administrative Courts, and Religious Courts) by the 
president as head of state. 
Furthermore, the executive power intervention in the judiciary can be carried out through the 
guidance of judges as civil servants (PNS) who are controlled by officials from their respective 
ministries. General Court Judges under the guidance of the Minister of Justice, Religious Court 
judges under the guidance of the Minister of Religion, and Military Court judges in the 
guidance of the Minister of Defense and Security. Even though these ministry officials are 
under the control of the president, because cabinet ministers are the president's assistants. 
Before the birth of Law no. 14 of 1970, there has been a very sharp difference between the 
judges gathered in the Indonesian Judge Association (Ikahi) which is supported by the 
Indonesian Advocates Association (Peradin) which has a different concept with the Ministry 
of Justice in regulating the first question, regarding the independence of the judiciary and 
second, the power judicial institution namely the Supreme Court to review (review) the validity 
of statutory regulations. Ikahi and Peradin wish that the independence of the judiciary should 
no longer be mixed with the Ministry of Justice's authority which can administer the personal 
and financial administrations of court judges. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Justice does not agree 
with the concept of Ikahi and Peradin which wants to separate judicial power from executive 
influence. In the end, Ikahi and Peradin's wishes were still not accommodated in the Law on 
Judicial Power (Law 14 of 1970), this was because Ikahi and Peradin had no power to influence 
the formation of laws which constitutionally belong to the President's authority approved by 
the DPR. 
So the regulation of judicial power through Law 14 of 1970 concerning the Principles of 
Judicial Power has not fully implemented the meaning of a rule of law which implies that a 
free and independent judiciary cannot be influenced or interfered with by other powers. 
Formally, the MA institution can be said to have been positioned as a free and independent 
judiciary, but substantially in the sense that the human and financial resources of this institution 
are still under executive control through the authority of the Ministry of Justice, which in fact 
is an assistant to President Soeharto. Regulations regarding the position of judicial power that 
are carried out by judicial institutions (Supreme Court and / or judicial bodies under the MA) 
according to article 1 of Law 14 of 1970 reads: judicial power is the power of an independent 
state to administer judiciary to enforce law and justice based on Pancasila, for the sake of its 
implementation. State of law of the Republic of Indonesia. This is reinforced by the sound of 
article 2 of Law Number 14 of 1985 concerning the Supreme Court, namely that the Supreme 
Court is the Supreme Court of the State from all areas of the judiciary, which in carrying out 
its duties is independent from government influence and other influences. As far as the 
provisions of Law 14/1970 and Law 14/1985, normatively, the judicial power is placed as an 
institution that cannot be interfered with by other powers (executive and legislative). But the 
hope for a judicial institution that is free and independent from the influence of the government 
or other powers during the New Order regime, is only hope, as has been stated by Nasution, 
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(2007) that it is difficult for the judiciary to avoid the influence of the government (executive), 
because it positions court judges as Civil servants whose guidance is under the Ministry of 
Justice will have an impact on the independence of judges in carrying out their judicial duties. 
The position of court judges is no different from civil servants as regulated in Law no. 8 of 
1974 concerning Personnel Principles, which results in the General Court environment as 
explained in the elucidation of article 13 paragraph (1) of Law no. 2 of 1986 concerning 
General Courts, that the Minister of Justice is obliged to provide guidance and supervision to 
judges as is customary for civil servants. Daniel S. Lev has commented that Indonesian judges, 
with a few exceptions, are not sufficient to provide provisions for the independence of the 
judiciary, because they place judges as civil servants. 
“… That Indonesian judges with a few exceptions do not tend to have a spirit of functional 
independence when they feel that they are civil servants, officials or have other feelings like 
that, namely being part of the bureaucratic layer to which high status is attached. Indonesian 
judges are not much different from judges in the civil law legal system. One of the implications 
of the role of civil servants is the patrimonial association of that role with political leadership, 
where it is against the will of the leaders that, in addition to other grounds, has overcome the 
independence of the judiciary. Whatever the influence of the day-to-day responsibilities of the 
Ministry of Justice, this influence is symbolically important as a reminder of the conceptually 
limited autonomy and direction of loyalty of the judiciary. "  
Regulations and institutional practices of judicial power after amendments to the 1945 
Constitution 
The regulation and practice of judicial power have changed significantly since the 1998 reform 
which had implications for the amendments to the 1945 Constitution (1999-2002). Article 24 
of the 1945 Constitution, which normally regulates simply the power of the judiciary, after the 
amendment is more complete it is formulated with a desire to strengthen the position of the 
judiciary in exercising judicial power freely and independently. Below the authors present in a 
table form how the differences in the norms of Article 24 before and after the 1945 
Constitution: 
Table 1. The differences in the norms of Article 24 before and after the 1945 Constitution 
Before the Amendment to the 1945 
Constitution 
After the 1945 Constitution 
Article 24. 
(1) The power of the Judiciary shall be 
exercised by a Supreme Court and 
other judicial bodies according to 
the law. 
 
(2) The composition and power of the 
judicial bodies shall be governed by 
law. 
Article 24 
(1) The power of the judiciary is the free power to 
administer the judiciary in order to uphold the law 
and justice. 
 
(2) The power of the judiciary shall be exercised by a 
Supreme Court and the judiciary under it in the 
general judicial environment, the context of 
religious justice, the military judicial environment, 
the state administrative judicial environment, and 
by a Constitutional Court. 
 
(3) Other bodies whose functions are related to the 
power of the judiciary shall be stipulated in the 
law. 
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Article 24 A 
(4) The Supreme Court shall be authorized to 
adjudicate at the cassation level, test the laws and 
regulations under the law against the law, and have 
other authority granted by law. 
 
(5) The supreme court justice shall have integrity and 
personality that is unimpeachable, fair, 
professional, and experienced in the field of law. 
 
(6) The supreme court nominee shall be proposed by 
the Judicial Commission to the House of 
Representatives for approval and subsequently 
appointed as chief justice by the President. 
 
(7) The Chairman and deputy chairman of the 
Supreme Court are chosen from and by the 
supreme court. 
 
(8) The composition and position, membership, and 
procedural law of the Supreme Court and the 
judiciary under it are governed by law. 
 
Article 24 B 
 
(1) The Judicial Commission shall be independent in 
its authority to propose the appointment of a 
supreme court justice and have other authority in 
order to maintain and uphold the honor, dignity, 
and conduct of the judge. 
(2) Members of the Judicial Commission shall have 
knowledge in the field of law and have integrity 
and personality that are not reprehensible. 
(3) Members of the Judicial Commission shall be 
appointed and dismissed by the President with the 
approval of the House of Representatives. 
(4) The composition, position, and membership of the 
Judicial Commission are governed by law. 
 
Article 24 C 
 
(5) The Constitutional Court shall be authorized to 
adjudicate on the first and last level whose 
decisions are final to test the law against the 
Constitution, to decide on disputes over the 
authority of state institutions whose authority is 
granted by the Constitution, to break the 
dissolution of political parties, and to decide 
disputes about the results of elections. 
(6) The Constitutional Court shall give a ruling on the 
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opinion of the House of Representatives 
concerning alleged violations by the President 
and/or Vice President according to the 
Constitution. 
(7) The Kosntitusi Court has nine constitutional 
judges appointed by the President, submitted by 
the Supreme Court, three by the House of 
Representatives, and three by the President. 
(8) The Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the 
Constitutional Court shall be elected from and by 
a constitutional judge. 
(9) Constitutional judges shall have integrity and 
personality that is unimpeachable, fair, statesman, 
who controls the constitution and state regulations, 
and does not concurrently serve as a state official. 
(10) The appointment and dismissal of 
contingency judges, the law of events and other 
provisions of the Constitutional Court shall be 
governed by the Law. 
Amendment to article 24 of the 1945 Constitution can be interpreted as strengthening judicial 
institutions to exercise independent judicial power in upholding law and justice, although this 
has been clearly stated in the formulation of article 24 which was before the amendment, but 
the statement of an independent judicial power "can only be found in the explanation of the 
article. . In addition, the amendment to this article has presented two state institutions, namely 
the Constitutional Court (MK) and the Judicial Commission (KY) which can assist and 
strengthen the Supreme Court. 
Consequently, the reform of the judicial power institution as stated in the constitution must be 
followed by the independence of the judge who is the main actor or key figure in the key person. 
Therefore, the law on the principles of judicial authority needs to be changed according to the 
mandate of the constitution, as well as the law which regulates the independence of judges in 
both the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. 
To realize the steps to improve judicial power after the amendment of the 1945 Constitution, 
Law No. 14 of 1970 concerning the Principles of Judicial Power was amended. UU no. 35 of 
1999 is a law that was first formed to reform judicial power based on Law 14 of 1970, but the 
amendments to this law were only limited to transferring organizational, administrative and 
financial control of the judiciary to become under the authority of the Supreme Court. As stated 
in Article 11 of Law 35/1999 which reads: Judicial bodies as referred to in Article 10 paragraph 
(1), are under the authority of the Supreme Court organizationally, administratively and 
financially. 
Furthermore, to reform the total governance of the judiciary, a new law on the principles of 
judicial power was carried out, namely Law no. 4 of 2004 concerning Judicial Power. In this 
Law was born to replace Law no. 14 of 1970 as amended by Law no. 35 of 1999. This is a 
consequence of adjustments to the amendments to Article 24 of the 1945 Constitution, which 
states that the administrators of judicial power are carried out by two judicial institutions, 
namely the Supreme Court (MA) and the Constitutional Court (MK). And each of these 
institutions (MA and MK) is then regulated more specifically by a law. 
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And now the law on judicial power has been replaced by Law no. 48 of 2009, which in its 
preamble states that in order to realize an independent judicial power and a clean and 
authoritative judiciary, it is necessary to organize an integrated judicial system. And Law no. 
4 of 2004 concerning Judicial Power is no longer in accordance with the development of legal 
and constitutional needs according to the 1945 Republic of Indonesia UUD. The author, 
observes at a glance that the birth of Law no. 48 of 2009, one of which is to regulate the 
existence of the Judicial Commission as a new state institution as a result of the amendment to 
Article 24 of the 1945 Constitution which functions to uphold the honor, dignity and dignity 
of the judiciary, through supervision of judges who violate the professional code of ethics of 
judges. 
Supervision of the code of ethics of the judge profession is imperative to maintain the 
independence or independence of the judiciary, judges are the main actors who can blacken 
law enforcement and justice by the judiciary in the midst of social, national and state life. 
Although judicial institutions (MA and MK) have been formally placed in our state 
administration, have become independent (independent), free and independent institutions 
apart from the influence of extra judicial powers, this will not mean anything at all if the judges 
carry out their duties and powers. In a case settlement, there is still an attitude that diminishes 
the value of integrity and credibility of judges by violating legal norms and professional ethics 
of judges. 
Conclusion 
The rule of law in the concept of rechtstaat, rule of law, and socialist legality, has signaled and 
required the existence of a judicial institution that is free and independent apart from the 
influence of powers outside the extra judicial judiciary. Thus, Indonesia, which states itself in 
its constitution as a rule of law, consequently must present a truly free and independent 
judiciary. Article 24 of the 1945 Constitution which principally regulates the provisions on 
Judicial Power, it turns out that before the 1998 reform, the regulation and implementation of 
the judicial power law did not position the judicial power freely and independently. Mainly 
during the time of President Soekarno (1945-1966), he clearly used the power of the president 
to intervene in the processes and decisions of the judiciary. The main instrument used is Law 
no. 19 of 1964 and Law no. 13 of 1965. During the reign of President Soeharto (1967-1998), 
he has succeeded in revising the judicial power law that was used during the reign of President 
Soekarno. The results of changes to the law on judicial power under President Soeharto gave 
birth to Law no. 14 of 1970, but the judicial power exercised by the judiciary (Supreme Court) 
based on this law is only formally positioned free and independent apart from the influence of 
executive power, but materially, namely control of the careers and finances of court judges is 
still under the executive power. . The renewal of judicial power after the amendment to Article 
24 of the 1945 Constitution, significantly changed the judicial system, which was previously 
only played by the Supreme Court. The presence of the Constitutional Court and KY is a 
strengthening of the judiciary so that it can fulfill a sense of justice for the community.  
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